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Abstract 
External Borrowing by LDCs: A Survey of Theoretical Issues 
This paper surveys a broad range of theoretical issues of 
international borrowing and lending with a focus on the effects of 
sovereign immunity. The literature in credit market imperfections 
and existing theoretical models of sovereign borrowing provide a 
basis for much of the survey. Several institutional features of LDC 
borrowing are discussed heuristically which have not been formally 
modelled in the literature. These parts of the survey are intended 
as an agenda for further work. A brie£ critical review of the 
econometric implementation of the theoretical models of sovereign 
lending is included. 
I am grateful to Willem Buiter and T. Paul Schultz for their many 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this survey. I remain solely 
responsible for all remaining errors or oversights. 
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External Borrowing by LDCs: A Survey of
Theoretical Issues 
1. Introduction 
Inflows of foreign capital have played a role in the growth of 
developing regions for several centuries. Portfolio lending to 
developing countries experienced an extended period of expansion 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although 
lending by the OECD countries to the LDCs grew steadily during the 
1960's, the rapid growth of syndicated bank loans after 1973 and 
reschedulings of the 1980's have recently brought widespread 
attention to the role of risk in international lending. 
International credit transactions are subject to the risks 
created by the sovereign immunity of debtors. In any setting, 
lenders encounter problems of the enforceability of contracts and of 
imperfect information about the characteristics and behavior of 
borrowers. One of the parties to a contract may later find reneging 
on some of their obligations in their best interests. Parties 
subject to the same legal jurisdictions can rely upon the authority 
of the state for a degree of enforcement of contracts. Loan 
contracts can incorporate performance requirements for debtors which 
rely on the legal institutions of the country for fulfillment in some 
contingencies. However, loans between governments or the nationals 
of different countries cannot rely on third party enforcement. 
Relationships between borrowers and lenders must be self-enforcing. 
Contractual terms are viable for which fulfillment is in the 
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enlightened self-interest of the debtor. With the absence of an 
external authority to enforce directly contractual obligations and 
the protection of debtor assets afforded by sovereignty, the 
enforcement of contracts necessarily occurs through the credibility 
of indirect sanctions for default. The interruption of other 
transactions, such as, future credit flows and trade agreements, 
between creditors and recalcitrant debtors provide the primary means 
of enforcement. 
Many writers on LDC debt have concentrated on the question of 
whether repayment difficulties are the result of a lack of debtor 
solvency or liquidity. In only a few instances, can an argument even 
be made that a country's net worth is negative; even if the output 
counted includes only that readily transferable to foreigners, the 
present value of the stream of resources available for repayment 
exceeds the debt of almost all borrowers. If the current problems 
are ones of liquidity, then an explanation is needed of why lenders 
fail to provide additional loans to ultimately solvent debtors. The 
theoretical literature on lending with potential repudiation provides 
a starting point for modelling this issue. The ability of debtors to 
default on their external obligations implies that credit 
transactions are constrained by the proclivity of borrowers to repay, 
rather than by their ability. The amount of debt that is likely to 
be voluntarily repaid, under the threat of sanctions, is less than 
that which could eventually be serviced. 




characteristics of borrowers can lead to major imperfections in the 
international credit market. Asymmetries of information lead to a 
variety of moral hazard and adverse selection issues in all credit 
transactions (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981 and 1983), for example). 
In domestic markets, covenants to loan contracts specifying borrower 
and lender behavior in various contingencies and legal institutions 
establishing bankruptcy procedures reduce many of these problems to a 
degree. In international lending, most loan covenants, for example, 
those establishing debt priorities, are not enforceable against a 
debtor. Because the penalties for default are indirect, moral hazard 
issues can arise through the ability of borrowers to take actions 
which reduce the costs of sanctions or the probability of 
penalization. 
Short-term contracts may govern long-term debtor-creditor 
relationships because they allow frequent renegotiation of the terms 
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of the relationship. When creditors have a limited ability to 
observe and restrain debtors' actions, many possible covenants to 
loan contracts specifying debtor behavior in various contingencies 
are unenforceable. The restricted ability of lenders to observe 
realizations of debtor income can lead to rescheduling of outstanding 
short-term debt. In one interpretation, rescheduling can be viewed 
as an outcome in some contingencies which is anticipated by both 
sides of the market; loan terms are rationally expected to be 
state-contingent. Another aspect of rescheduling is the strategic 
behavior of debtors and creditors, even when initial loans are made 
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under competitive conditions. The success of lenders to incorporate 
private sector loans extended without government guarantees into 
rescheduled public debt is evidence of their market power. 
This paper is intended to survey those insights that can be 
obtained from the theoretical literature on credit market 
imperfections, in general, and on lending with sovereign risk, in 
particular, for understanding the determinants of portfolio capital 
flows to the LDCs. Several implications of these basic models and of 
results from the theory of games for the institutions observed in LDC 
borrowing are suggested which have not yet been formally modelled. 
Four motives for external borrowing can be distinguished. If 
the value of output is subject to fluctuations, then borrowing to 
smooth consumption over time is advantageous when consumers are risk 
averse. Borrowing to finance capital accumulation can allow 
investment at a higher rate than otherwise optimal in a country with 
marginal productivity of capital exceeding the foreign rate of 
interest. The adjustment of consumption and investment following 
exogenous events, such as, terms of trade shifts, can be eased 
through foreign borrowing. Debt can also provide a media of exchange 
for international transactions, for example, the use of suppliers' 
credits for commodity trade. 
The next section discusses optimizing models of the pattern of 
borrowing for the first two motives which exclude the possibility of 
repudiation. The implications of imposing a solvency-type budget 
constraint are presented. Problems encountered by studying 
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non-optimizing models are also discussed. The simple motives of 
lenders to extend credit beyond that which can be repaid in full with 
certainty are discussed. 
The third section discusses the enforcement problem in 
international credit transactions and the possible sanctions for 
default. The credibility of threatened penalties is also examined. 
The points emphasized in this section are made in a variety of other 
sources; this exposition is quite similar to that given by Eaton, 
Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986), where the reader will find elaboration 
of many of the issues raised. 
The role of informational asymmetries for international credit 
transactions is surveyed in the subsequent section. A simple 
stochastic model of borrowing with potential default is presented to 
aid the exposition. The inability of creditors to monitor many of 
the actions of debtors and observe realizations of debtor-specific 
exogenous events can be related to a number of important market 
outcomes. The dominance of syndicated bank loans over bond debt, 
short original maturities of loans, debt-rescheduling, and 
reserve-holding behavior of debtors are discussed separately, 
although they are interrelated phenomena. One consequence of 
short-maturity structure, credit-rationing, and renegotiation is the 
possible procyclical pattern of lending in a consumption-smoothing 
framework. The role of borrowers' reputations in repeated lending 
games of incomplete information is also discussed; the co-existence 
of bond debt with syndicated bank loans and its apparent informal 
6 
priority is given as an example of the potential insights game theory 
may provide. 
The sixth section discusses the flight of private capital from 
debtor nations. Capital flight can result from public guarantees of 
private sector foreign debt, because foreign asset income usually 
escapes the increased taxation of domestic capital earnings implied 
by bankruptcies. The rtext two sections briefly discuss the effects 
of select debtor country policies on indebtedness and the possible 
implications of deposit insurance and inadequate regulation of 
intermediaries in creditor countries, respectively. The last section 
contains a brief review of econometric studies of the determinants of 
external credit flows and repayment crises. 
2. Solvency and International Lending 
A natural starting point for a description of equilibrium 
lending to LDCs are models of external borrowing in the absence of 
potential default. Such models provide insights into the pattern of 
borrowing under alternative motives and serve as benchmark case for 
the analysis of the effects of external disturbances and domestic 
policy choices on the borrowing behavior of households and firms. A 
number of papers on foreign borrowing use two-period models1 In 
these models, both the principal and interest on debts incurred in 
the first period must be repaid by the end of the second period; 
therefore, solvency requires that second period income equal or 
exceed indebtedness and the debt-service obligation. In any finite 
horizon model, the dynamics of borrowing are determined by the 
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exogenously set terminal level of debt. In an infinite horizon 
framework, debt principals need never by repaid; rather, the present 
value of debt-service payments must exceed the value of the 
principal. The steady-state net external asset position of the 
country is endogenously determined by optimization of some objective 
function. The solvency budget constraint requires that the present 
value of the stream of future income is not less than the current 
indebtedness. 
The pattern of borrowing and lending under the consumption 
smoothing motive can be examined in the absence of default risk in 
either finite or infinite horizon models. Clarida (1986) studies 
optimal borrowing in an infinite horizon general equilibrium model 
with stochastic income under the imposition of the constraint that a 
debtor is solvent with unit probability. Borrowing is 
countercyclical, and any level of debt which can be serviced given 
the equilibrium interest rate is reached with positive probability. 
Optimal borrowing by an initially capital-poor country for the 
purpose of accumulation has been modelled for one-sector economies by 
Bardhan (1967), for the small-country case, and Hamada (1966), in a 
two-country model. Since the domestic marginal productivity of 
capital initially exceeds that abroad, an exchange of bonds for 
capital leads to an increase in wealth and consumption. Current 
account deficits occur as the capital stock and consumption increase. 
In the steady state, the current account is balanced and trade 
surpluses cover interest payments on a permanent level of debt. In 
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two-sector economy models, early period current account deficits can 
be followed by surpluses for an initially capital-poor country. Engel 
and Kletzer (1985a) display such stages in the balance of payments in 
an optimal savings model with a tradeable investment good and a 
non-tradeable consumable under the usual Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions. 
Initially, bonds are traded for capital as resources move to the 
traded-goods producing sector. Thereafter, current account surpluses 
occur as resources shift toward the consumption goods producing 
industry; the capital stock rises or falls as wealth increases, 
depending upon the relative capital-intensity of the sectors. In the 
2steady-state, t he country can be eit. her a net deb tor or ered.itor. 
Another literature which emphasizes the ability of debtors to 
repay exists. Domar (1950) presents a simple way in which debt and 
debt-service can permanently grow: the growth rate of new lending 
must exceed the interest rate (Avramovic (1964) presents a similar 
analysis). Under this scheme, the initial principal is provided in 
exchange for nothing. This line of modelling is adopted by Kharas 
(1984) and Sachs (1984) in the context of borrowing in the presence 
of constraints on government revenue. When governments incur 
external debts, repayment is constrained by the ability of the 
government to raise revenue and transfer it abroad. In the absence 
of lump-sum taxation, deadweight losses and national income are 
endogenous to the level of revenue-raising attempted. In the Kharas 
paper, the debtor's growth rate is exogenous and exceeds the interest 
rate, so that an equilibrium in international asset markets will fail 
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to exist. The growth rate should be treated as an endogenous 
variable. Sachs (1984) uses a two-period optimizing model with an 
exogenously imposed constraint on government revenue in the second 
period. This leads to a higher marginal cost of revenue in that 
period and to optimal borrowing up to a point below that which 
equates the domestic marginal productivity of capital to the interest 
rate. As Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) emphasize, switching 
the period in which the constraint is binding reverses the result. 
While equilibrium intertemporal optimizing models only serve as a 
benchmark case, models which adopt arbitrary assumptions can lead to 
special or untenable conclusions. 
Solvency models exogenously impose a constraint on borrowing, 
rather than deriving such constraints on the supply of loans from 
creditors' optimizing behavior. In a stochastic income framework, 
loans can serve risk-sharing purposes, in addition to providing 
intertemporal trades. If repayment capacity is uncertain, then a 
lender generally will lend more than can be repaid in all 
contingencies on schedule. A risk-neutral creditor seeking to 
maximize expected profit will extend credit beyond that amount which 
can be serviced with certainty. Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) 
deomonstrate that such a lender would place an upper bound on the 
amount lent and incur a possibility of ex post losses. 
The maximum debt for which a borrower remains solvent may itself 
be endogenous because the resources available for repayment can 
depend upon repayment obligations. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show 
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that the choice of investment can vary with the loan contract taken. 
If lenders cannot observe directly the project selection of a 
borrower, then adverse selection results in their model. Increasing 
the interest rate can lead toincreases the riskiness of loans and a 
decrease in expected profits; therefore, credit rationing can result. 
An important implication is that solvency cannot be defined 
independently of the actions of agents on both sides of the market. 
A surprisingly large percentage of the discussion about the 
indebtedness of the LDCs has focussed on orthe solvency liquidity of 
debtor governments. The debts of countries are clearly less than the 
value of assets owned by governments and nationals in almost all 
cases. While the government may face limits in its ability to 
appropriate these assets, this action involves set of trade-offsa 
and is a choice taken by the government. As Gersovitz (1985) points 
out, Mexican oil reserves alone (the property of a parastatal) 
probably are adequate to cover Mexico's external debt. The other 
popular view is that borrowers have positive net worth but are 
illiquid. Clearly, the question of why are lenders unwilling to 
supply new credit arises. 
Instead, sovereign governments can elect to default on terms of 
a contract or repudiate outright external obligations. This ability 
impedes the international movement of capital. The subsequent 
sections discuss the implications of sovereign risk for modelling 
external borrowing by the LDCs. 
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3..soverei~n Immunity and the Voluntariness of Repayment 
Any credit transaction is subject to a potential problem of 
enforcement of the terms of the exchange. Nationals of the same 
country who enter into a contract can appeal to the external 
authority of the state in, the event of one party's reneging upon an 
obligation. To varying degrees, the legal frameworks of nations 
provide protection for parties to a contract in the event of the 
inability or unwillingness of one of them to abide by the terms of 
the contract. Contracts written between nationals of one country and 
nationals or the government of another, however, are subject to a 
potential problem of sovereign immunity. Generally, creditors have 
little or no hope of obtaining compensation for nonperformance in the 
debtor's own political and legal jurisdiction. The sovereignty of 
nations rules out the existence of a credible third party to enforce 
terms of contracts involving governments. Therefore, many 
international credit transactions can involve only contract terms 
which would be in the best interests~ post of the borrower to 
honor. Many of the institutions surrounding international lending 
can be understood best in terms of this need for contracts to be 
self-enforcing. The primary impediment to international capital 
flows to the LDCs is not seen in the ability of countries to repay, 
but instead in the voluntariness of fulfilling contract obligations. 
The major difference between international and domestic credit 
contracts is that the latter are legal obligations which are subject 
to enforcement under the power of the state. Debtors who are unable 
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to repay may file for bankruptcy, obtain protection from creditors 
and discharge of their obligations. Because repayment of external 
debt is largely voluntary, so that the penalties which can be imposed 
on a recalcitrant debtor country necessarily are indirect. A nation 
may suffer the consequences of incurring debt-service obligations it 
cannot service for an arbitrary period of time. Furthermore, while 
collateral plays a significant role in domestic lending, it plays 
virtually no role in international credit markets. Collateral 
remaining in the debtor country cannot be seized, and physical assets 
outside the country are often of little productive value (the 
exceptions tend to comprise value far less than outstanding debts of 
the LDCs). 
In any context, a loan is a particular form of contract between 
parties governing an intertemporal exchange. The contract specifies 
repayment terms and actions which may be taken by debtors and 
creditors in a variety of contingencies. The possibility that 
repayment obligations may not be met as contracted is reflected in 
the covenants of the loan contract. These covenants are intended to 
ensure that the borrower engage in certain activities and not engage 
in others which affect the likelihood of full repayment. Contracts 
also specify conditions under which the lender can suspend terms.of 
the contract prior to its expiration (in LDC lending, cross-default 
clauses serve this purpose). 
Loan covenants are useful only if the contingencies to which 
they apply and debtor's actions they stipulate are observable by the 
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lenders. A crucial determinant of the nature of the relationship 
between lender and borrower is the set of actions and outcomes that 
are observable by both and upon which covenants can be written. Debt 
contracts specify an amount to be lent and a schedule of repayments 
of interest and principal to be made, but these are, to varying 
degrees, state-contingent terms. The degree to which observability 
is incomplete affects the extent that debtor-creditor relationships 
are governed by explicit and by implicit contracts. The lesser is 
the ability of creditors to restrain the actions of debtors during a 
contract's term, the greater is the incentive to offer short-term 
agreements in long-term credit relationships. Short-term loans allow 
for frequent recontracting of the terms of the agreements, therefore, 
a finer degree of conditioning on borrowers' actions. 
The role of repetition of the relationship between borrower and 
lender should not be ignored. In a two-period framework, a borrower 
can either provide full repayment of a loan at the second date or 
default. A default is merely a payment of anything less than the 
principal plus agreed upon interest. In a multi-period setting, 
deviations from a repayment schedule do not necessarily imply that 
future payments will not maintain the present value of the loan. 
When credit relationships potentially last a number of periods, 
contracts may be renegotiated and entered into under full recognition 
of this possibility. A variety of responses by creditors to 
violations of the terms of the agreement are possible. As Eaton, 
Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) point out, declaration of a default is 
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only one of these. They define a default as occurring whenever a 
creditor formally declares that there has been a violation of a 
condition of the loan. The contract conveys upon the lender the 
right to declare a borrower in default; creditors may or may not 
choose to exercise this right. Therefore, default is the result of a 
sequence of decisions, not an automatic outcome. Insolvency of a 
debtor is not an adequate condition for the declaration of a default; 
the lender may lose the ability to obtain partial repayment by doing 
so. On the other hand, a default may be declared when a borrower has 
positive net worth. For example, declaration can follow the 
unwillingness of the debtor to repay other loans or the inability of 
the creditor to restrict actions of the borrower which increase the 
riskiness of outstanding debt. Formal declaration of a default in 
international lending can result in costly actions by regulators for 
both lenders and borrowers. The imposition of penalties by other 
governments on countries in default will tend to lower the expected 
flow of payments to existing creditors, even if anticipated payments 
fall below the amount lent in present value. 
Penalization of Default 
The willingness of sovereign debtors to abide by the terms of 
loan contracts depends upon the degree to which default can be 
penalized and the resolve of lenders to impose penalties. The 
penalties available to creditors include exclusion from future access 
to credit, interference with commodity trade, and disruption of 
access to trade finance. In the nineteenth century, military threats 
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against debtor nations and even the loss of sovereignty (Egypt) 
appear to have been credible threats. The suspension of favorable 
trade agreements, for example, revoking and granting to alternate 
suppliers voluntary quota arrangements, are probably credible 
contemporary threats along with embargoes on future lending. The 
nature of penalties is crucial to informative modelling of the 
international credit market, since the extent of capital flows to the 
LDCs depends upon the credibility of borrowers' willingness to repay. 
Kaletsky (1985) provides a comprehensive overview of the legal, 
political, and institutional issues involved in penalization of 
default. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981b) review U.S. legislation which 
provides for potential penalties to be imposed in the event of 
default on foreign obligations to the U.S. government or 
intermediaries. 
Exclusion from future credit access is an often cited potential 
penalty (the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) and Kletzer (1984) models 
adopt this penalty structure). A denial of future credit access only 
makes sense in an infinite (or equivalently, uncertain) horizon 
model, since in a finite horizon setting, the penalty has no force in 
the last period. Therefore, no loans are made in the next to last, 
and the penalty has no force in that period as well. A loan market 
is unsustainable. Similarly, moratoria on future lending are 
inadequate penalties to maintain loan transactions if a date will be 
reached after which the debtor only makes positive net payments. In 
the standard infinite horizon optimal capital accumulation models, 
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such a point is attained when the marginal productivity of capital is 
drawn into equality with the interest rate. As the capital stock 
grows, the potential cost of the penalty declines toward zero. In 
this context, exclusion from the credit market is an insufficient 
penalty to support any credit transactions by backward recursion. 
Furthermore, moratoria on credit access provide an adequate 
penalty to sustain lending only in infinite horizon models with 
stochastic debtor income. In this context, future flow of funds is 
in both directions so that the penalty can impose a cost on the 
debtor in any time period. If borrowers are risk averse, then the 
desire to borrow and the cost of moratoria derives from a motive to 
smooth consumption. Risk-neutrality on the part of lenders assures 
that some degree of lending will occur. In a capital accumulation 
model with stochastic output, the threatened denial of future credit 
can sustain lending for the purpose of investment if the borrower is 
risk-averse, since there is a cost to repudiation in the long run. 
However, the flow of capital to the country will be constrained by 
the extent of the penalty, so that, generally, the expected marginal 
productivity of capital will exceed the interest rate for extended 
periods. 
In the Eaton and Gersovitz and Kletzer models, increases in the 
cost of losing access to credit shift outward the supply schedule of 
loans. The penalty for default is higher the lower the rate of 
discount, greater the borrower's degree of risk aversion, greater the 
variance in income, lower the interest rate, and more costly are 
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domestically available avenues for consumption smoothing. Increasing 
the penalty raises the amount lent in these models which benefits the 
borrower. However, since output is stochastic, risk-neutral lenders 
will extend credit to a point where default occurs with positive 
probability. In these states, debtors are worse off, and the states 
of default are less probable reducing the insurance benefits of 
potential default for the borrowers. Therefore, the expected utility 
of debtors can either increase or decrease. 
An important role of international lending is in the financing 
of international trade. The cost of conducting barter trade is 
presumed widely to be quite high. Threatened trade embargoes or 
suspension of trade preferences can also provide incentives against 
debt repudiation. 
A set of issues can arise in applying penalties if the actions 
of a borrower affect the burden of sanctions. Committment to actions 
which lenders perceive as raising the burden will improve the supply 
of credit, and conversely. However, such actions must be observable 
by lenders and not easily reversed. 
The potential disruption of trade finance can be partially 
offset. Debtors have an incentive to accumulate foreign reserves in 
anticipation of a default, instead of fully meeting their 
debt-service obligations. At the same time, forestalling a 
declaration of default by creditors allows the time required for this 
accumulation. Many people may see the 1986 Peruvian limitation of 
private market debt-service payments and maintenance of service on 
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official (non-IMF) credits, while foreign reserves rose, in these 
terms. The efficacy of the penalty may be diminished because a 
default declaration is not currently in the creditors' interests. 
Penalization of a recalcitrant debtor through disruption of its 
international trade may be quite credible. If a debtor attempts to 
transact trade through banks on which it has defaulted, then any 
transactions balances can be attached to cover its debt obligations. 
Avoidance of the international banking system can significantly 
increase the cost of trading. Although punishment of a defaulter 
will often not increase the likelihood of ultimate repayment, a 
lender can credibly threaten to offset loan obligations against other 
balances of a non-performing borrower. 
Gersovitz (1983) and Alexander (1985) study models in which the 
penalty for default depends positively upon the importance of trade 
to the debtor. A committment to raise investment leads to an 
increase in the supply of credit if it increases the value of trading 
opportunities. If investment occurs in import-substituting 
industries, then it reduces the repayment incentive. 
A number of papers (Sachs (1984), Cooper and Sachs (1985), and 
Sachs and Cohen (1985)) assume that the penalty for default is a loss 
of income proportional to GNP. Among the conclusions they derive is 
the implication that if a credit-constrained debtor can commit funds 
to investment, instead of to consumption, then the supply of credit 
will expand. As Gersovitz (1985) makes clear, this conclusion easily 
fails to hold in models adopting penalties of credit or trade 
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embargoes. Also, a reasonable argument can be given that the higher 
a debtor's income, the more able it will be to accomodate itself to 
sanctions. 
The Credibility of Embargoes in Future Lending 
While governments and banks may reasonably be expected to reduce 
a country's trading opportunities in the event of a default, 
threatened moratoria on future credit access may not always be 
credible. Current creditors or other potential lenders may find 
continued flows of credit to a recalcitrant borrower profitable. In 
particular, the full suspension of future borrowing possibilities 
will not increase the probability of even partial repayment of old 
debt. 
In Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a), lenders are competitive so that 
any loan earns zero profit. They argue that, therefore, the costs of 
refraining from future lending are also zero. However, this 
equilibrium can be difficult to support under non-cooperative 
behavior amongst lenders. If all other creditors refrain from 
lending in the future to a defaulter, then any particular lender can 
provide a profitable loan. A cooperative outcome can arise in the 
infinite horizon case when borrowers' and lenders' identities are 
subject to recall by the other players in the repeated game. A 
player who fails to cooperate at one point (e.g. by defaulting) will 
face non-cooperative strategies chosen by the other players for some 
number of subsequent plays. The literature on repeated 
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non-cooperative games can be appealed to for a nwnber of results, 
notably when discount rates are small, a degree of cooperation can 
emerge in equilibriwn (see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)). 
The entry of new lenders during a moratoriwn on credit access 
enforced by old creditors can be restricted in repeated game models 
with imperfect information. The refusal of current creditors to lend 
may easily convey information to other potential creditors in this 
context. Also, the relatively small nwnber of international banks 
may be capable of cooperating in the exclusion of defaulters. The 
banks themselves may be able to enforce an embargo through their 
other transactions with each other. The syndication of bank loans to 
the LDCs may be seen partly as a response to the need to credibly 
impose sanctions for default. Additionally, a current lender faces 
the possibility of recovering previous loans if it makes new loans to 
a debtor having repayment difficulties. Therefore, new lenders may 
have less to gain by negotiating loans to a problem debtor than do 
existing creditors. 
Another possibility is that creditors can write covenants in 
loan contracts which pertain to other creditors' actions. These 
provisions, particularly seniority clauses, could be enforced in 
developed country courts to which both lenders are subject. 
Covenants of this type allow a creditor to obtain an enforceable 
judgment against another creditor in a common legal jurisdiction 
rather than attempt to enforce a contract with a sovereign borrower. 
Cross-default and seniority clauses in IMF and World Bank loan 
3 
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agreements may also lend credibility to sanctions. Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1983) discuss the potential incentive effects of debt senioity 
clauses and show that a refusal of a current creditor to lend leads 
to refusals of new lenders as well. 
Eaton (1985) emphasizes the importance of banks' reputations for 
punishing defaulters in maintaining the value of their equity. 
Owners of intermediaries are concerned with preserving their equity 
investments, and the failure to punish defaulting debtors causes this 
equity to lose its value. Eaton shows that the value of the equity 
must exceed the costs of penalizing borrowers. Therefore, if 
punishment is costly, banks' profits must be positive. This 
mechanism leads to a credible threat of punishment in an infinitely 
repeated game and to a lending rate of interest exceeding the deposit 
rate even if defaults never occur (e.g. in a non-stochastic model). 
The difficulty for a lender to credibly commit to a cutoff of 
credit to debtors is demonstrated by Hellwig (1977). In his model, 
lenders extend a line of credit to a borrower with income following a 
simple hazard process. The borrower's income is zero until it jumps 
to a permanent positive level; the probability of the jump is the 
same each period. Default occurs if before the jump has occurred, 
the credit ceiling is reached and no new credit is forthcoming. The 
lender always has an incentive to increase the credit line if it is 
exhausted prior to the increase in income. Otherwise, no repayment 
takes place, while new loans embody the possibility of servicing of 
old debt as well. The new loans need not be profitable if viewed on 
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their own, and good money is thrown after bad. Debtors have the 
incentive to increase their consumption in zero income periods, 
running down their credit lines rapidly. Therefore, by making an 
initial loan, a creditor enters a relationship in which additional 
loans may be profitably written but the total debt provides negative 
expected profits. Consequently, the loan market breaks down. 
4. Institutional Characteristics of LDC Borrowing 
The necessity for lenders to rely upon the enlightened 
self-interest of sovereign borrowers for repayment can be related to 
the characteristics which distinguish international credit markets 
from domestic ones in the developed countries. Informational 
imperfections may be responsible for many of the market outcomes and 
institutions surrounding capital flows to the LDCs. The inability of 
creditors to observe certain actions taken by debtors and outcomes 
leads to restrictions on the types of contracts which can be 
enforced, hence entered into. The domination of syndicated bank 
lending over bond lending, short maturity lending in long term 
debtor-creditor relationships, and rescheduling of debts can be seen 
as outcomes of the enforceability problem in sovereign lending. 
In this section, a basic model of borrowing with potential 
repudiation is presented in which debtor income is stochastic. The 
model makes a number of overly simplifying assumptions and is 
intended to serve only for drawing a few basic implications for 
modelling and serve as an aid to expositing the role of imperfect 
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information in the loan market. 
4.1 Basic Stochastic Model 
The simple model adopted is a variant of the Eaton and Gersovitz 
(1981a) one, following Kletzer (1984). Output is a random variable, 
which is identically independently distributed across periods. 
Debtors obtain utility from a discounted stream of felicity (current 
period utility) of consumption each period and face a moratorium on 
future lending if they default. Utility is given by, 
00 
V = E ~ fit U(c ), 
t=O t 
where O < fi < 1 and E(.) is the expectation operator. 
Output cannot be stored, and, for simplicity, the moratoria last 
forever. 
In the event of debt repayment, a borrower's utility is, 
and, if default is chosen, 
where R is the debt-service obligation, and y is output, a random 
variable. 
d rThe borrower defaults whenever V (yt) > V (yt,Rt). The model assumes 
that default or full-repayment are the only options available to a 
debtor. 
If loans mature in one period, then the expected profits to 
lenders are given by 
E~ = l•(P·(l+r) - (l+p)), 
where pis the opportunity cost of funds and rand£ are the interest 
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rate and size of the debt. Pis the probability of repayment which 
depends upon the terms of the current and anticipated future loan 
contracts. Kletzer (1984) shows that if the range of possible values 
for output is bounded and felicity is concave, then the probability 
of default increases with the interest rate and, eventually, with the 
amount lent. Expected profits fall below zero for any interest rate 
as the principal passes beyond an upper bound and for any positive 
principal as the interest rises beyond a finite bound. Therefore, 
the set of positive loan contracts which provide non-negative 
expected profits is bounded in both the amount lent and the rate of 
interest charged. These results are depicted in Figure 1, where 
continuity of the cumulative distribution of output and some 
additional degree of concavity have been assumed. The set of loan 
contracts in Figure 1 are those available to a particular debtor. 
Lenders may be assumed to be risk neutral. However, a concept 
of equilibrium must be explicitly adopted. Competition amongst 
lenders is a useful starting point for examining market outcomes. In 
this model, free entry in loan contracts (interest rates and quantity 
lent) is a natural characterization of perfect competition. If there 
are no asymmetries of information between lenders, then it is 
appropriate to examine Nash equilibria in loan contracts. In this 
model, a Nash equilibrium in loan contracts is simply the best pair 
of interest rate and amount lent for the borrower from amongst those 
loan contracts which provide non-negative expected profits. 
An important point is that the probability of repayment depends 
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upon total debt-service obligations, so that the amount any 
particular lender will provide in equilibrium depends upon the amount 
lent by others. A Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium with free entry 
in loan contracts if each creditor can observe the amount lent by 
others. In equilibrium, a contract must specify the interest rate 
and total concurrent amount lent to the borrower from all sources. 
Such contracts are enforceable only if the total debt service 
4obligations at each date are observable by each creditor. With 
general maturities of loans, contracts will need to specify the 
repayment schedule as function of thea stream of total debt-service 
obligations of the borrower at each date when a repayment is to 
occur. 
A Nash equilibrium in loan contracts is depicted in Figure 1, 
taken from Kletzer (1984). The concave curve, EV, passing through 
the equilibrium point, A, is an indifference curve for the debtor 
(constant expected utility given optimal default behavior). The loan 
demand curve, denoted id, gives the amount of credit which would be 
desired at each given rate of interest. In the presence of possible 
default, borrowers demand more credit than they would in its absence. 
For this consumption smoothing model, the indifference curves and 
curve 1d all vary with the realization of income, y. A smaller (that 
is, lower amount and interest rate) debt contract will be chosen with 
higher realized output. 
The first implication that can be drawn from this model is that 









must be rationed. The contract equilibrium can be supported using a 
non-linear interest schedule, that is, the interest rate as a given 
function of total concurrent indebtedness. However, the borrower 
cannot obtain all the credit demanded at the equilibrium rate of 
interest. This is the same type of credit-rationing demonstrated by 
5
Jaffee and Russell (1976) . 
The main point to be made here is that the terms of the loan 
contract are simultaneously determined. The interest rate and amount 
lent are both endogenous; the information of lenders which determines 
loan supply also determines the interest spread over the opportunity 
rate of interest. This point has been ignored in empirical studies 
6of LDC credit flows . 
Furthermore, the interest spread cannot be interpreted in terms 
of a risk premium. For example, an increase in the borrower's 
discount rate reduces the penalty for default and leads to a 
contraction of the set of loan contracts which provide creditors with 
non-negative expected profits. The resulting equilibrium loan 
contract can be shown to entail a reduction in the amount lent (more 
severely rationed credit, since the demand curve shifts outward with 
the increase in default probability for constant contracts) and 
either an increase or decrease in the interest rate charged. The 
risk of default is reflected in both terms of loan contracts. In the 
presence of equilibrium rationing, reductions in the amount lent 
reflect increases in risk; because the probability of default 




spread is ambiguous. 
An increase in the opportunity cost of capital to lenders or 
adverse shifts in the distribution of borrowers' incomes lead to a 
shrinkage of the set of loan contracts attaining non-negative 
expected profits. Because the set is bounded for principal amounts 
exceeding zero, combinations of given opportunity cost and low ranges 
of possible income can yield no positive profitable contracts. This 
may be seen as the source of exclusion of the low-income LDCs from 
the private external loan market. 
4.2 Syndicated Bank Lending 
One of the prominent institutional features of recent LDC 
borrowing has been the predominance of bank over bond lending, 
particularly through syndicated loans. Banks may be more able to 
enforce and monitor terms of loan contracts than bondholders. For 
example, the ability of banks to enforce seniority clauses and other 
covenants (such as cross-default clauses) between each other enhances 
their abilities to impose penalties upon reluctant debtors and 
renegotiate loan terms. Bondholders may be unable to agree upon 
terms of loan renegotiation because of their diverse interests or 
face significant transactions costs in doing so. While the value of 
bonds fluctuate on the secondary market varying the return to 
lenders, debtors may face only two options: continued full 
debt-service or default. Syndicated bank debt can be renegotiated 
changing both the value of the lenders' assets and the repayment 
obligations of borrowers. In the presence of sovereign immunity and 
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indirect enforceability, the ability of syndicates to reschedule loan 
payments through cooperation between creditors can give an advantage 
to bank over bond lending. 
Another important point is that the credit-rationing equilibrium 
described above requires that lenders can observe, therefore 
condition loan terms upon, the total concurrent debt-service 
obligations of their borrowers. Restricting total lending, when the 
priority of debt is unclear, requires cooperation between lenders. 
This may be costly in the case of bondholders and fairly easy to do 
through syndication. An example of an equilibrium notion suitable to 
the case of non-observability of total indebtedness by creditors is a 
interest-rate taking free entry equilibrium in the model of Figure 1. 
Such an equilibrium, if one exists, will result in a contract on the 
borrower's loan demand curve at its lowest intersection with the set 
of zero expected,profit loan contracts (point Bin Figure la). 
Contracts along the demand curve above this point will be dominated, 
for the borrower, by this contract. In general , such equilibria may 
fail to exist (in Figure lb, id does not intersect the set of zero 
expected profit contracts). If this type of equilibrium exists, then 
the debtor is always at least as well off in the Nash equilibrium 
with observed total indebtedness 7 . 
Syndicated bank loans may dominate LDC borrowing because of this 
potential asymmetry of information between lenders and each borrower. 
The ability of creditors to monitor total concurrent debt-service 
obligations has social value in this model. Because providing 
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additional loans raises the probability of default on all debt, 
lenders have an incentive to form a syndicate through which they can 
correctly observe the total lending by other members. A guarantee 
that an initial sale of bonds (at the Nash equilibrium level) will 
not be expanded subsequently is not credible in this model. 
Investment banks may or may not be able to credibly restrict bond 
issues they register through the equity value of their reputations. 
There are incentives to increase indebtedness ex post selling new 
bonds with higher yields. 
4.3 Debt Maturities 
The basic model above (as in Eaton and Gersovitz (198la)) 
assumes loan principals and interest payments are due after one 
period. Incentives to borrow using longer maturities are common, for 
example, gestation lags or investment costs with non-concavities in 
production may exist. In the simple repay-default framework, the 
accumulation of additional debt while paying debt-service without 
retiring principals on old debt generally will be an attractive 
option to debtors. In the consumption smoothing model without 
default, there would be no reason for particular debt-maturities to 
appear. However, the insurance aspects of the option of defaulting 
provide incentives for borrowers to prefer longer maturity debt 
contracts. 
An important aspect of sovereign risk is the inability to 
enforce many bond covenants common to domestic capital markets. 
Covenants restricting debt-dilution and establishing debt priorities 
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are essential to the use of long term loan contracts. Because 
increased lending reduces the profitability of current debt in the 
moral hazard model, long-term loans must anticipate possible 
subsequent additions to debt. New loans will be made which require 
concurrent debt-service with long-term loans if they are profitable. 
Because new lenders may possess more information than was available 
when an old contract was made in a stochastic framework, additional 
debt will often be profitable. The increase in debt which occurs 
with positive events (e.g. information that reveals an increase in 
the~ ante probability of repayment) reduces the ex ante 
profitability of a given long-term loan contract. If additional 
shorter-term loans are expected profitable, then with free entry of 
lenders, both new creditors and the current providers of long term 
debt have the same incentive to make such loans. Therefore, 
covenants restraining additional future borrowing cannot be credibly 
enforced in this setting. 
Sachs and Cohen (1985) argue that the interest spread on 
longer-term debt must rise as a consequence and that this can lead 
borrowers to choose shorter-term lower interest rate contracts. 
However, debtors may prefer longer-term contracts with higher 
interest rates and lower probabilities of full repayment, if they are 
offered, due to the insurance roles of long term debt. Kletzer 
(1984) points out that since the set of loan contracts which provide 
non-negative expected profits is bounded from above in the interest 
rate, the entire set of loan contracts which will be offered shrinks 
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with increasing maturities if information about ultimate outcomes is 
revealed over time. This implies that for maturities beyond some 
length, there may be no contract with a positive principal that 
creditors will offer. In a stochastic setting, only short and medium 
original term debt may be offered. 
While many motives for long-term debtor-creditor relationships 
exist, transactions may take place only through a sequence of 
short-term contracts because lenders are unable to observe and, 
therefore, restrain subsequent actions by borrowers. The lack of 
enforceability of debt-dilution and seniority clauses are only a 
single cause; a variety of moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems may also give rise to short-term debt obligations. For 
example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrate that borrowers' 
choices amongst risky projects depends upon the terms of loan 
contracts and is subject to adverse selection from the creditors' 
viewpoint. In the presence of asymmetries of information between 
debtor and creditor, the ability to change the terms of a 
relationship with greater frequency will be valuable. Contracts 
cannot rely on covenants which are not credibly enforceable; periodic 
renegotiation of the terms of the relationship provides incentives 
for performance on the part of debtor which long-term contracts may 
be incapable of achieving due to imperfect information. 
4.4 Debt Rescheduling 
In the simple stochastic Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) type model 
of lending with potential repudiation, creditors have an incentive to 
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renegotiate contract terms ex post when borrowers prefer default to 
full repayment. Since the original interest rate exceeds the 
opportunity cost of funds, creditors can still realize positive 
profits ex post for some reductions of repayment obligations, while 
incurring smaller losses in other instances than they would suffer by 
declaring a default. Likewise, debtors will prefer to pay something 
less than originally contracted and avoid the penalties consequent 
with default. When creditors possess complete information about 
debtors, debt-equity type contracts should emerge which allow, either 
explicitly or implicitly, for varying repayment obligations with the 
realized state of nature. Grossman and Van Huyck (1985) take this 
approach to interpreting debt-rescheduling. They suggest that since 
the conventional explicit legal contract only specifies a given rate 
of interest (which may float), lenders cannot increase the 
debt-service obligation prior to the contracted repayment date. 
Therefore, the set repayment schedule is the maximum of payments over 
states of nature. Lenders expect to receive less in many outcomes, 
and a default only occurs if the payment is less than the anticipated 
acceptable one for a given realized outcome. In the presence of 
sovereign immunity and credible penalties for outright repudiation, 
the basic model of this section can be used to show that risk-neutral 
lenders do not fully insure, that is, entirely smooth the consumption 
streams of, borrowers. Equity-debt contracts specifying 
state-contingent repayment obligations will be rationed in 
equilibrium. 
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If the income realizations of debtors can be observed by 
creditors, then loan contracts explicitly specifying state-contingent 
payments would arise. However, the standard debt-contract has been 
shown to be the optimal form of incentive-compatible contract for 
lending in two-period models when the state of nature can be observed 
only at a cost by the creditor (see Townsend (1978); also Gale and 
Hellwig (1985)). Costly observation of the realized income of 
debtors in a multi-period model with potential default could generate 
equilibrium standard debt contracts with renegotiation. The 
combination of the ability of borrowers to default and indirectness 
of penalties imply that equilibrium contracts will be of shorter 
original maturity than developed country corporate debt contracts and 
entail anticipated potential renegot{ation of repayment terms when 
outcomes can be observed, but only at a cost, by creditors. This is 
one interpretation of debt-rescheduling. 
The presence of creditors' incomplete information about debtors' 
characteristics can significantly affect the nature of 
debt-renegotiations. For example, lenders may be uncertain about the 
perceptions of borrowers of the costs of default penalization or the 
probability of particular sanctions being imposed. Even if lenders 
cannot observe the realized state of nature, debt-rescheduling could 
still take place. Debtors can be inhibited from persistently 
reporting poor outcomes because of the loss of reputation and 
deterioration of loan terms that result. Similarly, cooperation 
between lenders can arise, so that only certain types of arrangements 
34 
result, such as a lack of individual debt renegotiation in favor of 
simultaneous rescheduling of all outstanding debt. 
Debt renegotiations in which debtors seek to obtain new net 
capital inflows and those in which they desire to lengthen the 
horizon over which principals are repaid or reduce interest 
obligations can lead to basically different outcomes. Most recent 
reschedulings have involved debt-service postponement by countries 
attempting to reduce their external indebtedness; net payments are 
made to creditors, which are smaller than required by the original 
contracts. 
In the simple stochastic model of borrowing with potential 
repudiation, new lenders will only assume debt which assures 
non-negative expected profits. When a debtor realizes a poor output 
state, default with consequent penalization can be superior to full 
repayment and selection of a new zero expected profit debt contract. 
In this case, old creditors have an incentive to reduce debt-service 
obligations so that the borrower will choose not to default. If a 
debtor does not desire new inflows of capital, rescheduling results 
in a reduction in the present-value of the stream of repayments. 
When a debtor seeks a new net inflow of funds, old creditors are 
more likely to supply them. Existing creditors have the possibility 
of recovering old debt-service in addition to new repayments when 
they provide new loans. In a low income state, a borrower will 
choose between full default with penalization and accepting a 
renegotiated debt contract offered by existing creditors. Because 
35 
new lenders will not assume the old debts on terms which the borrower 
would accept (full repayment in this event is inferior to default), 
old lenders can offer a rescheduling of existing debt-service 
combined with new loans with repayment terms exceeding those 
available in the competitive market. New lenders may be willing to 
extend more favorable terms on new inflows if the old debts are 
rescheduled, but existing creditors can offer the rescheduling and 
new loans as a single take-it or leave-it package. Even if the 
original loans were made in a competitive market (that is, with free 
entry in contracts), debt-renegotiation involves strategic behavior 
on the part of both lenders and borrowers. 
Ozler (1984) presents a simple model of bilateral monopoly 
between lender and borrower. When the loan is made, second-period 
income and the penalty cost are both uncertain, but the borrower is 
known to be solvent. If income and penalty both exceed debt-service, 
then the debtor repays as contracted. If income falls below the 
repayment obligation, then the debtor seeks a rescheduling of 
debt-service. The new loan is made on more favorable terms for the 
lender than the initial loan because of the monopoly power the lender 
now has. On the other hand, if the penalty falls below the 
debt-service obligation, then the borrower threatens default and 
extracts concessionary terms from the lender. Ozler examines the 
effects of rescheduling announcements on the equity value of banks 
and finds that reschedulings during the late 1970's increased bank 
market values while those during the early l980's reduced them. 
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Of course, other explanations of rescheduling exist. Banks may 
agree to postpone debt-service for insolvent or recalcitrant 
borrowers because managers are wrong about a debtor's proclivity or 
ability to repay, acting in the best interests of their own careers 
and moving on, acting in shareholders' best interests by postponing 
costs regulators will impose, or hoping that official and 
multilateral agency creditors will take over portions of the debt. 
Potential problems for lending can be created by the short-term 
nature of original loans in the presence of potential default and 
consequent credit-rationing. If the simple model of borrowing is 
extended to allow more general stochastic income processes (other 
than identically independently distributed ones), then low income 
states can lead to reductions in the amount of debt lenders wish to 
hold. For example, when output realizations are positively serially 
correlated and debt matures in one period, the set of loan contracts 
providing non-negative expected profits shrinks inward in low-income 
states. Because original maturities are shortened for reasons of 
imperfect information, lending becomes procyclic in the 
consumption-smoothing framework. Net principal retirements are 
desired by creditors when income is low and additions to debt 
forthcoming when income is high. Besides providing a reason in 
addition to borrowing for investment for the observed strongly 
procyclical pattern of lending to LDCs, this model could provide a 
basis for depicting panics amongst lenders. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) present a game model of bank runs. 
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Each depositor is better off withdrawing funds if others do so, but 
everybody benefits if nobody withdraws their deposits. Essential to 
the result is the assumption that deposits are refunded in full on a 
first-come, first-served basis. When lenders wish to hold fewer 
assets in a country, the net payments required rise (at the same time 
the value of output falls) which raises the probability of default. 
As one creditor withdraws, the profitability of others' loans are 
adversely affected. Without well-defined debt seniorities, this 
could potentially lead to a crisis. 
Sachs (1984) and Krugman (1985) suggest models similar to 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), substituting syndicated bank loans for 
bank deposits and allowing current income to fall short of 
debt-service obligations. Sachs assumes that each bank faces an 
upward-sloping marginal cost curve of loans; banking regulations or 
risk-aversion are cited as possible sources. This implies that a 
single creditor may find extending the entire loan to avoid default 
unprofitable. Because the refusal of one creditor to relend raises 
the probability of default on other loans of other creditors, an 
externality exists so that cooperation between lenders can lead to a 
superior outcome. However, as already noted, a new loan need not be 
expected profitable on its own to be offered by an existing creditor. 
The bank already holding the largest amount of debt will be most 
willing to extend further credit. 
Gersovitz (1985) points out that both the Sachs and Krugman 
models really explain the prorating of payments moratoria and 
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reschedulings across lenders and not rescheduling itself. In the 
Diamond and Dybvig model, intermediaries are unable to recoup the 
full value of their investments after one period, but depositors are 
able to claim the full value of their deposits on a first-come, 
first-served basis so that a depositor panic can result. A sovereign 
debtor for which resources available for repayment fall below 
debt-service obligations has an incentive to unilaterally reschedule 
payments, proportionally revaluing the assets of creditors. If 
creditors all face the same increasing marginal cost of funds, then 
debtors will each minimize their losses by accepting partial 
proportional payments if a debtor is incapable of servicing the 
complete debt. A lender panic does not occur for the same type of 
reason runs on mutual funds do not occur. 
4.5 Debt and Reserve-Holdin~ 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1980) present an interesting empirical 
finding: foreign reserves rise as debtor countries are rationed more 
severely on international credit markets. Reserve-holding by debtors 
can be justified by the same transactions cost arguments that serve 
for creditors. However, credit market imperfections and default 
sanctions can be identified as additional sources of motives for 
reserve-holding and help explain the pattern of reserve accumulation 
by borrowers. 
The difficulty encountered in explaining reserve holding by 
debtors in the absence of transactions costs is that the interest 
paid on debt should equal or exceed that earned on reserves. We have 
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already argued that short original debt maturities in a model of 
credit-rationing under potential repudiation with a general 
stochastic income process can lead to a procyclical pattern of 
lending (which happens to be socially inefficient). The supply curve 
of credit shifts inward with low income realizations, so that the 
cost of credit increases and eventually becomes infinite. The gap 
between the marginal borrowing rate of interest and the discount rate 
during low income events can compensate for the gap between the 
interest rate on debt (or, more generally, the marginal productivity 
of domestic capital) and the interest earned on reserves. This 
motive for further consumption-smoothing through saving in the form 
of reserves derives from the presence of a credit constraint. In 
general terms, uncertainty about the future marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption between periods and the future marginal 
cost of borrowing leads to the holding of precautionary reserves. 
The imperfection in credit markets creates the insurance role for 
reserves. The addition of capital accumulation to the model will 
introduce possible precautionary motives in investment. 
The costs of default penalization also provide a precautionary 
motive for reserve-holding for the same reason in the same framework. 
The cost of accumulating some reserves ex ante may be offset by the 
reduction in the likelihood of default they facilitate. Available 
reserves allow continued debt-service with a smaller reduction in 
current consumption, so that the benefits in low income events are 
simultaneously increased consumption and reduction in the probability 
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of facing default and consequent sanctions. In the context of 
borrowing and lending with imperfect information, reserves provide 
insurance to allow continued debt-service payments during low income 
events, so that the possible reputation costs of debt rescheduling 
can be avoided. Losses of reputation can lead to adverse shifts in 
the supply of loans in any given future event. These costs will also 
offset the current opportunity cost of holding foreign reserves. 
The discussion so far implies that an autonomous increase in the 
reserves held by debtors during poor events will have a positive 
impact on the probability of repayment and functioning of the 
international credit market. However, reserves may rise in 
anticipation of repudiation, as was noted in section 3. If default 
sanctions include interference with access to trade finance, then 
increasing foreign reserves reduces the cost of penalization, as long 
as reserves cannot be confiscated by creditors. The probability of 
default may rise instead of fall because reserves are precautionary 
8
savings against default sanctions. 
4.6 Debtors' Reputations and Repeated Games of Incomplete 
Information 
A number of references have been made to the possible role of 
borrowers' reputations in models that emphasize asymmetries of 
information in the credit market. Recent results in the theory of 
games with incomplete information are likely to find widespread use 
in theoretical models of international financial markets. Aizenman 
(1986) presents a variant of the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) 
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certainty model of lending with potential repudiation in which 
creditors possess incomplete information about the perceptions of 
debtors of the costs of penalties for default. Lenders form beliefs 
about borrowers' penalty cost perceptions which are summarized by a 
probability distribution. Debtors know the exact cost of sanctions. 
Aizenrnan uses the model to generate an upward-sloping, then 
backward-bending, supply curve of loans analogous to that derived 
from a stochastic model (e.g. Figure 1). 
Some insights might be gained by stating an explicit equilibrium 
notion for this model. The setup can be represented by an extensive 
form game with incomplete information. An appropriate equilibrium 
concept is the sequential equilibrium one proposed by Kreps and 
Wilson (1982b). Multiple sequential equilibria exist for the model. 
Restricting attention to those equilibria in which default never 
occurs yields a potentially useful insight. In such equilibria, loan 
contracts are offered which provide non-negative expected profits 
given lenders' prior beliefs about a debtor's perceived default 
penalty, and equilibrium repayment obligations are less than the 
actual penalty perceptions of debtors. Even though repudiations 
never occur in such sequential equilibria, creditors' beliefs are not 
controverted. However, updating priors may be inappropriate, because 
extending more favorable loan terms may lead to a default. 
Therefore, learning by creditors is costly. Information which 
adversely alters a debtor's reputation can have persistent effects. 
An example of the applicability of games of incomplete 
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information to the interpretation of international credit market 
institutions is the existence of bond lending to LDCs along with 
syndicated bank loans. The dominance of bank over bond lending has 
already been discussed. However, a large number of medium and high 
income LDCs have floated bonds on international markets since 1973, 
and approximately $27 billion of bond debt is currently outstanding 
(the bulk is Mexican and Brazilian). Furthermore, during recent debt 
rescheduling, interest payments on and amortization of bond debt 
continued. Bondholders have little option to declaring default if 
payments are suspended; the prospect of repayment is already 
reflected in the value of bonds on the secondary market. Therefore, 
lenders will hold bonds only if the borrower is inhibited from 
defaulting on individual bonds. An equilibrium with positive bond 
debt under potential default is possible in a reputational game 
because the ability to issue future bond debt depends upon 
maintaining the servicing of existing bonds; the cost of a failure to 
completely fulfill obligations to current bondholders is the loss of 
any access to the bond market. Moreover, the cost of defaulting on 
bond obligations, however small, can lead to a loss of reputation in 
all asset markets in a game of incomplete information, so that the 
supply of bank loans is contracted or a default is declared by other 
creditors. 
Many of the characteristics of external lending to the LDCs 
might find explanations in repeated games of incomplete information. 
However, these games typically possess multiple equilibria, and the 
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qualitative nature of equilibria often is very sensitive to the 
particular assumptions made about the information possessed by 
different players. While some insights might be gained into the role 
of debtors' and creditors' reputations in the market, the approach is 
unlikely to yield empirically testable models. Models based on the 
characteristics of perfect equilibria in repeated stochastic games of 
complete information which incorporate the enforceability problem are 
difficult to handle but may be much more promising. 
5. Private Capital Flight and Public Debt 
A widely publicized feature of large debtor countries is the 
significant extent of the acquisition of foreign assets by their 
citizens. Using different methodologies, Dooley, gt~ al., (1983) and 
Cuddington (1985) estimate that up to one half, and possibly more, of 
the increase in the gross indebtedness of Argentina, Mexico, and 
Venezuela during the period 1974-1982 was offset by private outflows 
of capital. Standard portfolio diversification can explain large 
two-way flows. If capital flight is a result of such motives, then 
it is not the outcome of a market failure requiring intervention. 
However, the imperfect enforceability of international debt contracts 
provides a basis for concern. 
In the presence of sovereign immunity, lenders may have little 
ability to impose penalties on individual private debtors or assess 
the value of their assets in the event of bankruptcy. Creditors are 
likely to have a greater ability to penalize the country as a whole 
for default, so that capital inflows are in the form of loans to the 
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government or to private borrowers with government guarantees. 
The majority of lending to the LDCs has taken the form of public 
or publicly-guaranteed debt. In the absence of ex ante explicit 
guarantees, governments have been held accountable by lenders for the 
debts of private borrowers. Diaz Alejandro (1985) gives an example 
of the extent of implicit public guarantees of private debt. The 
Chilean government explicitly did not guarantee foreign loans to 
several private banks. However, when these banks failed, creditors 
demanded and received repayment from the government. 
Diaz Alejandro (1984) links capital flight from large Latin 
American debtors to the subsidization and public guaranteeing of 
private debt and the ability of nationals to avoid domestic taxation 
of the income from foreign assets. Eaton (1986) presents a model in 
which capital flight can be generated by the tax obligations implied 
by the potential nationalization of private debt. Explicit and 
implicit government guarantees create an interdependence between 
private investment decisions through the public sector budget 
constraint. Actions which raise the probability of one borrower's 
default increase the anticipated tax obligations of other borrowers. 
The other borrowers have an incentive to place their assets abroad, 
thereby increasing the probability of default on their own loans. 
Multiple equilibria exist in each version of Eaton's model. In 
one of these, all creditors restrict loan amounts given debtors' tax 
obligations, so that investing domestically and fully repaying debts 
are in each borrower's self-interest. Potential nationalization of 
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private debts provides an incentive to borrowers to invest abroad, 
raising the expected tax obligations of all borrowers. Therefore, 
another equilibrium exists in which all debtors invest abroad and the 
government defaults on foreign debt. 
A similar approach is taken in Eaton and Gersovitz (1986), in 
which public borrowing is shown to lead to possible capital flight 
because of the implied increases in the taxation of domestic 
investment income with increased debt. Khan and Haque (1985) model 
capital flight as a response to an asymmetry in the risk of 
expropriation facing domestic and foreign investors. Nationals face 
a higher risk of expropriation by their government, so they invest 
abroad. Consequently, domestic investment is financed with foreign 
loans. Using the Eaton and Gersovitz (1986) argument, the 
governments expropriation decision can be related to public 
indebtedness. Expropriation and other forms of taxation are a means 
for raising government revenue to meet external debt-service 
obligations. Increases in public debt contribute to the private 
sector's anticipated taxation. If assets located abroad escape 
taxation and the risk of expropriation, then capital flight can be a 
consequence of extensive foreign borrowing. 
Much discussion of capital flight from Latin American debtors 
has emphasized the role of overvalued currencies and domestic 
financial instability. Dornbusch (1985) points out that the threat 
of devaluation in the presence of currency overvaluation is a primary 
source of capital flight. Inflationary finance, a form of taxation 
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of domestic capital, can lead to capital flight as an application of 
the analysis of Eaton (1986). 
6. Debtor Country Policies 
The consequences of domestic policies for external borrowing are 
a significant concern for countries facing imperfect international 
credit access. Debtor countries having repayment difficulties will 
undertake policies intended to improve their current account 
balances. Furthermore, the option of defaulting introduces moral 
hazard issues in the selection of domestic policy; part of the risk 
of policy choices is borne by creditors. Poor policy-making is cited 
as a source of repayment difficulties, often because capital flight 
is a perceived outcome. 
The presence of a rising cost of external credit with 
country-wide indebtedness implies that an optimal policy response is 
to assure that the domestic rate of interest equals the marginal cost 
of foreign credit rather than the average cost. Aizenman (1986) 
shows that this can be achieved through borrowing taxes if domestic 
credit markets are not subject to imperfections. If moral hazard, 
adverse selection, or enforceability problems arise in domestic 
credit transactions, then additional time-varying taxes and subsidies 
are necessary. Adoption of optimal taxes on foreign borrowing and 
second-best commodity taxes and subsidies in the presence of domestic 
market imperfections requires policymakers to possess complete 
information on the external indebtedness of the country. Recent 
experience has shown that most large debtor nations have had verya 
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limited accounting of public and publicly-guaranteed foreign 
borrowing. 
The adoption of policies to improve the current account is 
widespread, as is concern that liberalization of trade can lead to 
debt problems. Tariffs are widely thought to bring about current 
account improvements because they raise the relative price of 
importables. In a general equilibrium context, this is not 
necessarily the case. The effect of tariffs on the excess of saving 
over investment depends on their effects on the desired long-run 
levels of physical capital and wealth in the economy. Engel and 
Kletzer (1985b) show that permanent tariff increases have an 
ambiguous effect on the rate at which a country borrows from abroad; 
the result depends crucially upon the particular formulation of 
household objectives in an optimizing framework. Calvo (1986) 
demonstrates that temporary liberalization often leads to increasing 
indebtedness because consumers' intertemporal consumption plans 
anticipate the future change in relative prices. The implication is 
that an intended permanent liberalization can lead to current account 
deficits if households perceive the possibility of future reversal. 
As a consequence, a reversal of the plan can become optimal. Calvo 
proposes that borrowing restraints accompany trade liberalization 
programs. 
A much less rigorously studied issue is debtor-optimal policy 
choice under potential default. If debtors are able to commit 
themselves to follow some policies over others, then improved loan 
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terms will be forthcoming. Commitment is essential, since increased 
lending is accompanied by moral hazard problems when default is 
possible. The presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in 
policy choices suggests an important role for multilateral agencies 
in the coordination of lending to the LDCs. IMF conditionality can 
be seen as potentially imposing commitment to policies from which a 
debtor would optimally deviate ex post. In the presence of creditor 
imperfect information, IMF involvement may be essential to the terms 
of loan contracts. When lenders infer information about debtor 
characteristics from other lenders' actions, IMF and World Bank 
lending may play important roles in the formation of borrower 
reputations. 
7. Creditor Country Regulation 
Since the debt crises of 1982 began, a popular view in the 
creditor nations has been that the banks lent too much. Although 
bankers may have made ex ante profitable loans which ex post they 
would prefer not to have written, there is the possibility that 
market imperfections lead to inefficient lending practices. The 
implications of basic models of lending with enforceability problems 
is that credit is rationed and capital flows less than would occur if 
potential sovereign default were not possible. 
Kletzer (1984) discusses the potentially important inefficiency 
in international lending which results when lenders are unable to 
observe the magnitude of concurrent lending. Since the lending of 
each additional amount raises debt-service obligations, the 
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probability of default on all outstanding debt increases. Therefore, 
in a rationing equilibrium the interest rate depends on the total 
amount borrowed from all sources and not on the size of the 
particular loan. In the absence of observability of total concurrent 
indebtedness, if an equilibrium exists, then more is lent at a higher 
rate of interest than in an equilibrium with observability. The 
debtor is worse off as a result (see section 4). Because seniority 
clauses are less extensive and foreign loans are often made to a 
variety of government agencies, public enterprises, and private 
sector firms under government guarantee, the problem of observability 
of total debt may be significant for international lending. The 
dissemination of information on the external private and official 
debt of LDCs could be coordinated by the IMF and World Bank in an 
effort to alleviate this type of international credit market 
imperfection. 
Because lenders have less information about their borrowers than 
the debtors themselves or different information than do other 
lenders, another informational externality arises. Information about 
the credit-worthiness of borrowers can be inferred by the willingness 
or lack thereof of other creditors to lend. This externality could 
contribute to panics by lenders, in which each lender's attempt to 
protect themselves by withdrawing increases the likelihood others 
will also, so that no one is able to recover their assets. The 
revision of a debtor's reputation induced by other lenders' cutbacks 
can lead to a further reduction in the willingness to lend, 
so 
increasing the probability of default. 
Public insurance of bank deposits is widespread in the developed 
countries. This insurance promotes capital market efficiency by 
reducing the need for depositors to monitor bank activities or demand 
large risk premia. As a result of deposit insurance, banks have 
incentives to increase the riskiness of their portfolios. Bank 
regulation accompanies insurance to restrain moral hazard on the part 
of management. 
The amount of bank capital lent to a single borrower is 
restricted in the U.S.; however, countries or individual agencies in 
countries were not classified as a single borrower. Therefore, banks 
could increase insurers' exposure to risk while raising expected 
profits. 
Regulators could take two steps to deter moral hazard problems. 
The first is adopt full disclosure of lending to individual 
countries. Increased reporting (which has occurred in the U.S.) can 
allow more extensive monitoring of banks portfolios by depositors and 
shareholders and reduce the problems created by incomplete 
observation of indebtedness by all lenders. The other step is to 
require bank capital increases. The rescheduling of loans otherwise 
in default allows banks to pay dividends on interest income created 
by new loans. This act can raise the upper bound on an insurance 
claim arbitrarily high. 
Compensation of bank managers can also create moral hazard 
difficulties. The performance of one banks' management is likely to 
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be judged by that of other banks. A manager who fails to undertake a 
high-yield, high-risk loan which is repaid will suffer, while if all 
banks make loans which fall into default, then any particular manager 
is unlikely to be blamed. This can lead to significant correlation 
of risk between banks' portfolios. Regulations restricting 
management actions and increasing disclosure can partially offset the 
adverse effects of these incentives. 
8. Empirical Implementation of Theories of Sovereign Borrowing 
A number of econometric studies of LDC borrowing are available. 
This section critically reviews the general approach of many of these 
studies in terms of the theoretical analysis of sovereign lending. A 
comprehensive review of the empirical literature is not intended. 
Existing econometric work investigates sovereign borrowing and 
lending in two circumstances. Several studies examine voluntary 
lending and attempt to identify determinants of the level of debt and 
the terms on which it was contracted. A second group concentrates on 
when debt problems occur. The factors influencing a resumption of 
voluntary lending to problem debtors have not been modelled. 
Empirical implementation of theories of lending under sovereign 
risk faces two basic problems. Information on the terms of loans is 
incomplete; studies must use some level of aggregation over loan 
contracts. Cumulative debt figures include public foreign debt and 
private debt covered by varying degrees of government guarantee, 
explicit or implicit. Another problem is the absence of suitable 
exogenous variables which vary across debtors. The terms of trade 
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are an important source of external disturbances which may be treated 
as roughly exogenous for many LDCs; however, few other variables 
exist. A primary problem with much of the extant empirical 
literature is the inclusion of variables endogenous to external 
capital flows as explanatory variables. 
Estimation of the determinants of outstanding debt and voluntary 
credit flows requires allowing for the possibility that desired debt 
levels exceed a creditor imposed debt ceiling. In the absence of 
repayment problems, two regime models must be used. With problem 
debtors in the sample, three (or more) regimes are necessary to allow 
for both voluntary and involuntary lending. 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1980 and 1981a) estimated a two-regime 
version of their model using data from forty-five countries for the 
two years 1970 and 1974. They find that the credit-constrained 
regime is more prevalent than the unconstrained one. Hajivassiliou 
(1985) estimates a three-regime model using a panel set of data for 
seventy-nine countries over the period 1970-1982. By accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity across debtors, persistent country effects 
are found over time. 
Bank loans to the LDCs typically specify the interest rate as 
the sum of a reference rate, usually the London Inter-Bank Offer 
Rate, and a spread. The spread is fixed for the term of the loan, 
while the reference rate floats. As noted in section 4, the quantity 
lent and repayment terms are jointly determined. In a stochastic 
setting, the interest spread is endogenous to the same set of 
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variables that determine quantity (in the certainty version of the 
Eaton-Gersovitz model, the spread is zero). However, several studies 
treat the rate as exogenous. An alternative econometric approach to 
that taken by all authors would be simultaneous estimation of the 
spread and amount lent; however, such an exercise may require 
extensive individual loan data rather than the aggregated loan data 
available to these authors. Hajivassiliou (1985) cites evidence that 
interest spreads are not responsive to the same variables which 
determine credit inflows. More complete information on loan terms is 
necessary to adequately test for exogeneity. In particular, interest 
payments do not comprise the full return to lenders, for example, 
front-end fees are widespread in sovereign lending. 
Interest spreads reflect the riskiness of loans but are not 
strictly risk premia, because the amount lent is rationed and also 
reflects lenders' perceptions of risk. McDonald (1982) surveys a 
number of studies which attempt to interpret the spread as a risk 
premium. In addition to poorly revealing creditors' risk 
assessments, spreads should reflect other factors, such as differing 
tax treatment of interest income across borrowers. These studies use 
a number of explanatory variables the inclusion of which is not 
derived from a well-stated model of sovereign lending. For example, 
while the maturity of debt is not exogenous to the other terms of 
loan contracts, the term structure of debt is often included as an 
independent variable. 
A large number of econometric studies of LDC borrowing 
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concentrate on debtor nations which experienced debt-servicing 
difficulties. McDonald (1982) provides a review of a number of these 
papers. McFadden, et. al., (1985) adopts a multi-regime model which 
emphasizes borrowers falling first into arrears and then possibly 
rescheduling. Events are analyzed rather than credit flows. The use 
of the occurrence of a debt problem as a dependent variable creates a 
number of difficulties: debt problems are hard to define. Because 
the formal declaration of a default can be costly to lenders, some 
debtors experiencing debt-servicing problems may not be identified. 
Borrowers may not choose to explicitly repudiate so that penalties 
are delayed and reduced. Rescheduling of some loans may not reduce 
the present-value of the debt, while in other cases, it will. The 
adoption of the event of rescheduling as a dependent variable does 
not allow for a distinction between these instances. Of primary 
interest in debt-servicing problem cases are the determinants of the 
future flows of capital. The study by Hajivassiliou (1985) which 
includes incidences of repayment problems in an analysis of the 
determinants of the flows of funds is a step in this direction. 
Edwards (1984) also analyzes problem debtors. The interest 
spread is selected for the dependent variable, while the amount lent 
is used as an independent variable. As in many other papers, Edwards 
uses explanatory variables which are likely to be jointed determined 
with the dependent variable, for example, international reserves to 




This paper has attempted to survey ideas developed in the 
literature on the role of sovereign immunity in international capital 
markets. A number of implications of the enforcement problems and 
informational imperfections in international credit markets for the 
nature of capital flows to the LDCs have been discussed; many of 
these have not yet been modelled rigorously. The relationship 
between sovereign immunity and debtor country macroeconomic policy 
choices and the role of multilateral agency and official lending for 
coordinating capital flows have received sparse attention in the 
theoretical literature. Many of the econometric studies of sovereign 
borrowing have not taken account of the theoretical analysis and fai~ 
to recognize the simultaneity of the determination of dependent and 
explanatory variables. The inadequacy of data on private sector 




1. For example, see Sachs (1984). 
2. Fischer and Frenkel (1975) display stages in the balance of
payments in a non-optimizing model with a fixed saving rate. The
results of Engel and Kletzer (1985a) are derived in a small
country model with endogenous time preference, but they clearly
generalize to other saving formulations and to a two-country
framework. 
3. See Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986). 
4. Arnott and Stiglitz (1982) discuss the importance of
observability of total insurance purchases in moral hazard models
at length. The comparison between credit market equilibria with
and without observability in Kletzer (1984) draws on this paper
extensively. 
5. This type of equilibrium credit-rationing contrasts with that
derived by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Here (and in Jaffee and
Russell (1976)) each borrower receives a loan smaller than what
they demand at the equilibrium rate of interest. In the
Stiglitz-Weiss adverse selection model, some borrowers' projects
are fully-funded and other potential borrowers receive no funds
even though they demand them at the equilibrium rate of interest. 
6. For example, see McFadden, et. at., (1985) and Edwards
(1984). 
7. See Kletzer (1984) and, also, Gale and Hellwig (1985). 
8. O'Connell (1986) discusses these issues in a bargaining game
with incomplete information. 
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